Quasi-set theory was proposed as a mathematical context to investigate collections of indistinguishable objects. After presenting an outline of this theory, we define an algebra that has most of the standard properties of an orthocomplete orthomodular lattice, which is the lattice of the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space. We call the mathematical structure so obtained I-lattice. After discussing, in a preliminary form, some aspects of such a structure, we indicate the next problem of axiomatizing the corresponding logic, that is, a logic which has I-lattices as its algebraic models. We suggest that the intuitions that the 'logic of quantum mechanics' would be not classical logic (with its Boolean algebra), is consonant with the idea of considering indistinguishability right from the start, that is, as a primitive concept. In other words, indiscernibility seems to lead 'directly' to I-lattices. In the first sections, we present the main motivations and a 'classical' situation which mirrors that one we focus on the last part of the paper. This paper is our first study of the algebraic structure of indiscernibility within quasi-set theory.
Introduction
Indiscernibility is a typical concept of quantum physics, and some facts implied by indiscernibility, as the properties of a Bose-Einstein condensate, have no parallel in classical physics. Without considering that quanta are indiscernible, no explanation of colors would be done, no vindication to the periodic table of elements would result, and, among other things, Planck would not arrive to his formula for the black body radiation. Some authors have sustained that quantum indiscernibility results from the raise of quantum "statistics" (really, ways of counting), while others think that they can explain quantum statistics without presupposing indiscernibility, but at the expenses of rejecting equiprobability.
1
That discussion is still alive, and we have much to do in the philosophical, epistemological, logical, and on ontological aspects of quantum indiscernibility, mainly if we agree (with Arthur Fine) that philosophy of science should be engaged with on-going science (apud [14] ). This leads us directly to the quantum field theories, and perhaps more, to string theories and to quantum gravitation. Acknowledging this naturalistic claim, we shall be here quite modest in discussing some algebraic aspects of a mathematical theory which was conceived to deal with indistinguishable objects, the quasi-set theory. Without revising all the details of such a theory (to which we refer to Chapter 7 of [15] ), we shall keep the paper self-contained so that the reader can understand the basic ideas, although sometimes in the intuitive sense, and only the really necessary concepts and postulates are mentioned.
It should be recalled that indiscernibility enters in the standard quantum formalism by means of symmetry postulates. The relevant functions for systems of many quanta ought to be either symmetrical or anti-symmetrical, and this assumption makes the expectation values to assume the same values before and after a permutation of indiscernible elements. Thus, physicists (and philosophers accept that) say that "the individuality was lost," as if there would be something to lose. In this work, we enlarge our research program of providing a mathematical basis for quantum theory that takes indiscernibility "right from the start", as claimed by Heinz Post [25] (see [15] ), with the algebraic discussion of indiscernibility. All the considerations are performed within quasi-set theory, which we revise in its main ideas below.
Quasi-sets
Quasi-set theory, denoted by Q, was conceived to handle collections of indistinguishable objects, and was motivated by some considerations taken from quantum physics, mainly in what respects Schrödinger's idea that the concept of identity cannot be applied to elementary particles [29, p. 17-18] . Of course, the theory can be developed independently of quantum mechanics, but here we shall have this motivation always in mind. Our way of dealing with indistinguishability is to assume that expressions like x = y are not well formed in all situations that involve x and y. We express that by saying that the concept of identity does not apply to the entities denoted by x and y in these situations. Here, quantum objects do not mean necessarily particles, but ought to be 1 This is the particular van Fraassen's view; for instance, he supposes two particles 1 and 2 in two possible states A and B, and the possible cases are: (i) 1 and 2 in A; (ii) 1 and 2 in B, both cases with probability 1/3 each; (iii) 1 in A and 2 in B; (iv) 1 in B and 2 in A, both with probability 1/6. According to this author, this way we can arrive at Bose-Einstein statistics [31] . But the problem is that situations (iii) and (iv) need to be distinguished from one another, and if the involved quanta are indiscernible, this can be done only either by the assumption of some kind of hidden variable or by some form of substratum, and we know that both possibilities conduce to well known problems. thought as representing the basic objects of quantum theories, which although differ form one theory to another ([12, Chapter 6]), have some common characteristics, as those related to indiscernibility (with the exception of some hidden variable theories, like Bohm's, which will be not discussed here).
2 Due to the lack of sense in applying the concept of identity to certain elements, informally, a quasi-set (qset), that is, a collection of such objects, may be such that its elements cannot be identified by names, counted, ordered, although there is a sense in saying that these collections have a cardinal. This concept of cardinal is not defined by means of ordinals, as usual -see below. But we aim at to keep standard mathematics intact, 3 so the theory is developed in a way that ZFU (and hence ZF, perhaps with the axiom of choice, ZFC) is a subtheory of Q. In other words, there is a "copy" of ZFU into Q, that is, this theory is constructed so that it extends standard Zermelo-Fraenkel with Urelemente (ZFU). In this case, standard sets of ZFU can be viewed as particular qsets, that is, there are qsets that have all the properties of the sets of ZFU, and we call then Q-sets. The objects in Q that correspond to the Urelemente of ZFU are termed M -atoms. But quasi-set theory encompasses another kind of Urelemente, the m-atoms, to which the standard theory of identity does not apply. More especially, expressions like x = y are not well formed when m-atoms are involved.
When Q is used in connection with quantum physics, these m-atoms are thought as representing quantum objects (henceforth, q-objects), and not necessarily they are 'particles', as mentioned above; waves or perhaps even strings (and whatever 'objects' sharing the property of indistinguishability of pointing elementary particles) can be also be values of the variables of Q. The lack of the concept of identity for the m-atoms make them non-individuals in a sense, and it is mainly (but not only) to deal with collections of m-atoms that the theory was conceived. So, Q is a theory of generalized collections of objects, involving non-individuals. For details about Q and about its historical motivations, see [5, p. 119] , [9] , [15, Chapter 7] , [17] , and [20] .
In Q, the so called 'pure' qsets have only q-objects as elements (although these elements may be not always indistinguishable from one another), and to them it is assumed that the usual notion of identity cannot be applied, that is, x = y, so as its negation, x = y, are not a well formed formulas if x and y stand for q-objects. Notwithstanding, there is a primitive relation ≡ of indistinguishability having the properties of an equivalence relation, and a concept of extensional identity, not holding among m-atoms, is defined and has the properties of standard identity of classical set theories. Since the elements of a qset may have properties (and satisfy certain formulas), they can be regarded as indistinguishable without turning to be identical (being the same object), that is, x ≡ y x = y. Since the relation of equality, and the concept of identity, does not apply to m-atoms, they can also be thought as entities devoid of individuality. We further remark that if the 'property' x = x (to be identical to itself, or selfidentity, which can be defined for an object a as I a (x) = def x = a) is included as one of the properties of the considered objects, then the so called Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) in the form ∀F (F (x) ↔ F (y)) → x = y is a theorem of classical second-order logic, and hence there can not be indiscernible but not identical entities (in particular, non-individuals). Thus, if self-identity is linked to the concept of non-individual, and if quantum objects are to be considered as such, these entities fail to be self-identical, and a logical framework to accommodate them is in order (see [15] for further argumentation).
We have already discussed at length in the references given above (so as in other works) the motivations to build the quasi-set theory, and we shall not return to these points here, 4 but before to continue we would like to make some few remarks on a common misunderstanding about PII and quantum physics. People generally think that spatio-temporal location is a sufficient condition for individuality. Thus, an electron in the South Pole and another one in the North Pole are discernible, hence distinct individuals, so that we can call "Peter" one of them and "Paul" the another one. Leibniz himself prevented us about this claim (yet not directly about quantum objects of course), by saying that "it is not possible for two things to differ from one another in respect to place and time alone, but that is always necessary that there shall be some other internal difference" [21] . Leaving aside a possible interpretation for the word 'internal', we recall that even in quantum physics, where fermions obey the Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says that two fermions (yes, they 'count' as more than one) can not have all their quantum numbers (or 'properties') in common, two electrons (which are fermions), one in the South Pole and another one in the North Pole, are not individuals in the standard sense. 5 In fact, we can say that the electron in the South Pole is described by the wave function ψ S , while the another one is described by ψ N (words like 'another' in the preceding phrase are just ways of speech). But the joint system is, in a simplified form, given by ψ SN = ψ S − ψ N (the function must be antisymmetric in the case of fermions, that is, ψ SN = −ψ N S ), a superposition of the two first wave functions, and this last function cannot be factorized. Furthermore, in the quantum formalism, the important thing is the square of the wave function, which gives the joint probability density; in the present case, we have ||ψ
This last term, called 'the interference term,' can not be dispensed with, and says that nothing, not even in mente Dei, can tell us which is the particular electron in the South Pole (and the same happens for the North Pole), that is, we never will know who is Peter and who is Paul, and in the limits of quantum mechanics, this is not a matter of epistemological ignorance, but it is rather an ontological question. As far as quantum physics is concerned with its main interpretations, they seem to be really and truly objects without identity.
In the next sections, we shall discuss from an algebraic point of view some issues of non-individuality. It should be interesting to recall that the 'qset'-operations of intersection (∩), union (∪), difference (−) work similarly in Q as the standard ones in usual set theories.
Algebraic aspects: the lattice of indiscernibility
Quantum logic was born with Birkhoff and von Neumann's paper from 1936 [1] .
Today it consists in a wide field of knowledge, having widespread to domains never thought by the two celebrated forerunners. For a look on the state of the art, see [10] . The main idea is that the typical algebraic structures arising from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is not a Boolean algebra, but an orthocomplete (σ-orthocomplete in the general case [10, p. 39]) orthomodular lattice. We shall see below that in quasi-set theory, by considering indiscernibility right from the start, a similar structure 'naturally' arises. Let us provide the details before ending with some comments and conclusions. Now we need of the concept of Tarski's system and topological space.
Definition 3.1 (Tarski's Space) A Tarski's Space is a pair (E, − ) where E is a non empty set and
− be a function 
Proof: See [13] . 
Hereafter, we shall be working in the theory Q, and use the equality symbol = to stand for the extensional equality of Q. Intuitively speaking, x = y holds when x and y are both qsets and have the same elements (in the sense that an object belongs to x iff it belongs to y) or they are both M -objects and belong to the same qsets. It can be proven that = has all properties of standard identity of first-order ZFC. Qsets which may have m-atoms as elements are written (in the metalanguage) with square brackets "[" and "]", and Q-sets (qsets whose transitive closure have no m-atoms) with the usual curly braces "{" and "}".
We start with the concept of cloud that will to point to the algebraic aspects whose we are involved. 
Intuitively speaking, A is the qset of the elements of U (the universe) which are indistinguishable from the elements of A. If A is a Q-set, that is, a copy of a set of ZFU, then of course the only indistinguishable of a certain x is x itself, thus A = A.
Theorem 3.3 The application
6 that associates to every subqset of U its cloud is a Tarski's operator and (U, − ) is Tarski's Space.
Proof: (i) A ⊆ A: Let t ∈ A. Then, by the reflexivity of ≡, we have t ≡ t,
Then there exists x ∈ A such that t ≡ x. But then there exists y ∈ A such that x ≡ y. By the transitivity of ≡, we have t ≡ y, hence t ∈ A.
From now on, we shall suppose that U is closed, that is, it contains all the indistinguishable objects of its elements. Some interpretations linked to physical situations are possible. For instance, A can be thought as the region where the wave function A of a certain physical system is different from zero. Another possible interpretation is to suppose that the clouds describe the systems plus the cloud of virtual particles that accompany those of the considered system. But in this paper we shall be not considering these motivations, but just to explore its algebraic aspects.
It is immediate to prove the following theorem:
Proof:
In the same way, B ⊆ A ∪ B and B ⊆ A ∪ B. Thus A ∪ B ⊆ A ∪ B. Conversely, suppose t ∈ A ∪ B, then there is x ∈ A ∪ B such that t ≡ x. So there is t ≡ x such that x ∈ A or x ∈ B. In this way t ∈ A or t ∈ B and therefore t ∈ A ∪ B.
(ii) It follows immediately from the definition of cloud that ∅ = ∅.
The next definition introduces the lattice operations on subqsets of a qset U , the universe. 
We note that even if A ∩ B = ∅, may be that A ∩ B = ∅. Proof: (c) Associativity (unrestricted): (we shall be using items (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 3.1 without mentioning):
(e) The properties of 0 and 1:
(iv) A ⊔ 1 = A ∪ U = U = U = 1 (recall our initial hypothesis that U is closed).
Theorem 3.7 The lattice C of the closed qsets of U is distributive.
Proof: We shall emphasize those passages which make use of the hypothesis that the qsets are closed.
3.1 (iii) and because A ∪ B and A ∪ C are both closed, for otherwise the equality does not hold]
This result is not surprising, for we are dealing with set theoretical operations which, defined on the closed qsets of U , act as the usual set theoretical properties on standard sets. But if we consider all qsets in U and not only the closed ones, the distributive laws do not hold, as we can see from the above proof, which makes essential use of the fact that the involved qsets are closed (without such an hypothesis, the proof does not follow). Since the corresponding structure I = P(U ), ⊓, ⊔, 0, 1 has similarities with a lattice with 0 and 1, we propose to call it the lattice of indiscernibility, or just I-lattice for short. Other distinctive characteristics of this "quasi-lattice" are obtained when we introduce other operations similar to those of order and involution, or generalized complement [10, p. 11] . At Section 4, we sum up the main properties of an I-lattice. 
Definition 3.7 (I-order)
But the hypothesis tells us that C ∪ A = A and C ∪ B = B, hence C ⊆ A and We have proved that ≤ is both reflexive and transitive ((i) and (iii) above), but only "partially" anti-symmetric, that is, A ≤ B and B ≤ A entail A = B. Thus, P(U ), ≤ is a kind of "weak" poset. Since it contains 0 and 1 and since any two elements of U have a supremum (namely, A ⊔ B) and an infimum (namely, A ⊓ B). I is a "weak lattice", but of course it is a lattice stricto sensu if we consider only closed qsets.
The complement of a qset A relative to the universe U is the sub-qset of U , termed A ⊥ , which has no element indistinguishable from any element of A.
Definition 3.8 (I-involution, or Generalized I-complement)
Theorem 3.9 Let A, B ∈ P(U ). Then:
Informally speaking, in U − A there are no elements indiscernible from the elements of A (according to definition of cloud). Thus, it is closed, and coincides with A ⊥ = U − A.
Properties (v) and (vi) of the preceding theorem show that ⊥ is an involution for closed qsets. For qsets in general, we shall call it I-involution, in the spirit of the above discussion. 
equality holds for closed qsets).
The lattice I is I-orthomodular, that is, if A ≤ B, we have that
Theorem 3.11 (I-orthomodularity) For all A, B ∈ P(U ):
Definition 3.9 (Orthogonality) Let A, B ⊆ U . We say that A is orthogonal to B, and write A ⊥ B, when:
⊥ . Furthermore, a collection S of elements of P(U ) is called pairwise orthogonal iff for any A, B ∈ S such that A = B, it results that A ⊥ B.
Intuitively speaking, A ∩ B = ∅ (by the way, this could be an alternative definition) says that A has no element indistinguishable from elements of B.
In quantum logic, the operations ≤ and ⊥ are usually understood as an implication relation and a negation relation respectively. Thus, we may introduce the concept of logical incompatibility just using the idea of orthogonality ([10, p. 12]): A is incompatible with B iff A implies the negation of B, that is iff they are orthogonal. The negation of the relation ⊥ is called accessibility (ibid.), written A ⊥ B.
All of this show that our structure I resembles a non-distributive orthocomplete orthonormal lattice, and it is a Boolean lattice if we consider only the closed qsets. Since every modular ortholattice is orthomodular [10, p. 15] , it is an open question whether our lattice has some similarity with modular lattices, that is, A ≤ B entails A ⊔ (C ⊓ B) = (A ⊔ C) ⊓ B (we still need to check this and other results).
Summing up
We resume here the properties of the quasi-lattice I = P(U ), 0, 1, ⊓, ⊔, ⊥ , ≤ :
As we see, it is a rather unusual mathematical structure which resembles the non-distributive ortholattice of quantum mechanics. What the specific Iproperties show is that sometimes we need to consider the closure of a certain qset for getting the desired result. If we interpret the qsets of elements of U as extensions of certain predicates, which might stand for physical properties, the necessity of considering the closure of the qsets show that some fuzzy characteristic of these properties are been shown. In fact, take for instance a qset A as the extension of a certain property P , that is, A should stand for the collection of objects having the property P 7 . Then, for instance, if we transform A twice by the operation ⊥ (I-involution -1), we do not obtain A anymore, but the qset of the indiscernible of its elements. It seems that something is changed when we operate with the collections of objects of the physical systems: we really transform them, as we really do with quantum systems. But we remark that the physical interpretation of such a structure and its consequences is still being investigated. For the moment, let us keep with its mathematical counterpart only.
The corresponding logic
In this section, we shall be dealing with the first ideas for an alternative axiomatization of a logic that has as its algebraic counterpart the I-lattice, based on the above assumptions and definitions. We remark once more that this is only a preliminary sketch, and maybe some modifications would need to be done, but let us continue even so. As before, we shall be working within the theory Q. The concepts introduced below, which mirror the standard ones, can be developed in the "standard part" of Q, so that we can use the usual mathematical terminology. Here, as before, the equality symbol "=" stands for the extensional equality of Q.
Let us take our algebra I = P(U ), 0, 1, ⊓, ⊔, ⊥ . Now we shall introduce a generalized (or abstract) logic L = F, T , , , ∼, ։ in the sense of [4] , and we shall continue to use use → ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀ and ∃ as metalinguistic symbols for implication, conjunction, disjunction, negation, the universal quantifier, and the existential quantifier, respectively. The elements of the Q-set F will be called formulas, and denoted by small Greek letters, while the elements of T (T ⊆ P(F )) are the theories of L, and denoted by uppercase Greek letters (indices can be used in both cases).
To begin with, let us see how we link such a logic with the quasi-lattice I. Suppose that there is a valuation v : F → P(U ) such that:
(ii) and are binary operations on F , and we denote the corresponding images of the pair α, β respectively by α β and α β. These operations obey the following rules:
(iii) ∼ is a mapping from F into F , and we define v(∼ α) = (v(α)) ⊥ , for any α ∈ F . This means that if v(α) = A, then v(∼ α) = U − A according to the above definitions; (iv) F ∈ T , this is the trivial theory; (v) If {Γ i } i∈I is a collection of elements of T , then Γ i ∈ T .
It is clear that this definition is an algebraic characterization of our logic L by means of the lattice I. Some immediate consequences of this definition are:
It is well known that in standard quantum logics there is an "implicationproblem", to use Dalla Chiara et al.'s words [10, p. 164] . That is, all conditional connectives "that can be reasonably introduced" in quantum logics are "anomalous" (ibid.), and this was taken by some authors as a motive to criticize quantum logics as not being "real logics". As Dalla Chiara et al. say, there are some conditions that a conditional would satisfy to be classified as an implication 8 . These conditions are:
Conditions for an Implication (i) identity, that is, α * → α, being * → the considered conditional;
(ii) modus ponens, that is, is α is true and α * → β is true, then β is true (op. cit., p. 164); (iii) In an algebraic semantics, a sufficient condition is: for any structure
We say that a formula α is true in the structure I, and write I |= α iff v(α) = 1, for any valuation v. In this case, I is a model of α. We write Γ |= α to mean that every model of (the formulas of) Γ is model of α. Finally, α is valid iff it is true in every structure which is an I-lattice. In this case, we write |= α. It is quite obvious that our aim is to prove a completeness theorem for our logic relative to the given semantic, but to do so we need to introduce the concept of deduction from a set of premises. To begin the issue we shall finish only in a forthcoming paper, let us define implication.
This conditional is quite similar to that one called "Dishkant implication" in [23] . Using the above definitions and Theorem 3.1 (ii), it is immediate to see
and, since v(α) = 1, we get that v(β) = 1. Thus, our conditional obeys conditions (i) and (ii) of the Conditions for an Implication. In addition, we can see that condition (iii) is also fulfilled. In fact, by the hypothesis, we have |= α ։ β, so v(β (∼ α ∼ β) Let us make a further remark on this definition. We say that A ∈ P(U ) is definable by a formula α ∈ F if v(α) = A. Let β be such that v(β) = A. Is there such a β? The answer is in the affirmative. Since A ⊆ A, then v(α) ≤ v(β), hence by condition (iii) above, |= α ։ β. So, β is any formula implied by α. This affirmative makes sense, for v(α ։ β) = 1 and v(β) = A say that
This fact will be important for the definition of the connectives of the logic L.
Finally, let us say that α և ։ β = def (α ։ β) (β ։ α).
Next we introduce the notion of syntactical consequence from a set of premises, written Γ ⊢ α, as follows, where v(Γ) = [v(α) : α ∈ Γ] (the terminology is from Q -see again Section 2, if necessary). Let ⊢ α abbreviates ∅ ⊢ α, while α ⊢ β abbreviates {α} ⊢ β (recall that they are Q-sets, so the standard notation can be used), and Γ ⊢ α says that it is not the case that Γ ⊢ α. It is immediate to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 In L, we have (i) α ∈ Γ ⇒ Γ ⊢ α. In particular, α ⊢ α;
(ii) Γ ⊢ α ⇒ Γ ∪ ∆ ⊢ α; (iii) If Γ ⊢ α and for every β ∈ Γ, we have that ∆ ⊢ β, then ∆ ⊢ α; (iv) If {Γ i } i∈I is a family of subqsets of F such that for every α, α ∈ Γ ↔ Γ i ⊢ α, then ∀α(α ∈ i∈I Γ i ↔ i∈I Γ i ⊢ α).
Proof: Immediate, for the definition of consequence is standard (see [4] , [24] ).
We shall not continue to develop the syntactical aspects of this logic (in algebraic terms, but see [4] ), but just try to link it with the semantic aspects sketched above. The least theory containig α is denoted T α , and it coincides with the intersection of all theories containing α (op. cit.). Thus, Γ ⊢ α iff v(α) ⊆ v(T α ). In particular, if Γ is a theory, that is, Cn(Γ) = def [α : Γ ⊢ α] = Γ, then v(α) ⊆ v(Γ), and in particular v(α) ⊆ v(Γ). Finally, let us recall that since no deduction theorem holds in quantum logics [22] , the same seems to happen here due to the nature of our implication (but this is still a open problem).
The last point of this paper, which conduces us to another work, is the question: how to characterize the logic L axiomatically? We shall follow the approach of generalized logics in the sense of [4] , but not here.
